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The Self:
A Transpersonal Neuroanthropological Account
Charles D. Laughlin

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
The anthropology of the self has gained momentum recently and has produced a significant body of
research relevant to interdisciplinary transpersonal studies. The notion of self has broadened from the
narrow focus on cultural and linguistic labels for self-related terms, such as person, ego, identity, soul,
and so forth, to a realization that the self is a vast system that mediates all the aspects of personality.
This shift in emphasis has brought anthropological notions of the self into closer accord with what
is known about how the brain mediates self-as-psyche. Numerous examples from the ethnography of
the self are given, as are neuroscience research reports on the structure of the self. Engagement with
the self is seen as an essentially transpersonal one, as self-awareness penetrates the mysteries of the
transcendental self.
Keywords: Brain & self, no-self, transcendental, meditation, cross-cultural, transpersonal
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My brain and I are inseparable. I am who I am because my brain is what it is. Even so, I often think about
my brain in terms different from those I use when thinking about myself. I think about my brain as that
and about myself as me. I think about my brain as having neurons, but I think of me as having a memory.
Still, I know that my memory is all about the neurons in my brain. Lately, I think about my brain in more
intimate terms—as me.
					—Churchland, 2013, p. 11

he anthropology of the self has gained momentum
recently and has produced a significant
body of research relevant to interdisciplinary
transpersonal studies.1 But along with this upsurge
of interest has come considerable confusion over just
what constitutes the self. Contemporary anthropology
offers very little in the way of a paradigmatic school of
thought about self. Aside from remnants of the early 20th
century impact of Freud on psychological anthropology,
the discipline really has not developed a theoretically
coherent approach to the self. Anthropology offers
nothing in the way of a depth psychology of the self,
nothing like Jungian archetypal psychology or Kohutian
self psychology around which to organize research, to test
hypotheses, and to explain patterns. With the possible
exception of medical anthropology, anthropology is
largely a natural science with very little input from either
experimental research or clinical practice. However,
what anthropology does offer is information about how
non-Western peoples experience, conceptualize, and talk
about the self. This ethnographic perspective perforce
broadens understanding of the ways people have come

to develop psychologically and to know themselves,
more often than not in transpersonal terms. It is the
aim of this paper to provide transpersonal researchers
with an array of conceptual tools designed to enhance
their understanding of self, especially as it relates to the
advanced spiritual practices of non-Western societies.
Self:
First Steps Toward a Definition
he word “self” is, of course, an English term, which
has its own distinct history of use and meaning.
Etymological dictionaries indicate that the word comes
from the Old English self, seolf, sylf (“one’s own person,
same”) and is related via Proto-Indo-European *selbaz
to the Old Norse sjalfr, Old Frisian self, Dutch zelf,
Old High German selb, and Gothic silba. The Old
English form was emphatic, expressing “(I) myself,”
“(he) himself,” and so forth, and implied reference to
both a physical-spatial meaning (self and no-self) and
a temporal meaning (same self through time; “I am the
same person today as I was yesterday;” see Brockelman,
1985, p. 81). Today one uses the word self to refer to a
person’s essential being, that which distinguishes them
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from others, and especially understood as the object of
introspection or reflexive action. Implied in the term
is the phenomenological “sense of self,” self as directly
experienced as distinct from other. Moreover, one can
signal the continuity of self through time by such phrases
as “back to his old self again.” Conversely, one can signal
that some change has occurred in a person by phrases
like “he wasn’t himself today.” Hence, the connotation of
self implies both physical and psychological boundaries,
and both physical and mental continuity through time.
It is clear that from ancient times self has had
an inherently ambiguous meaning—what I will call
hereafter self-as-being and self-as-psyche. One may use
self to label the fact that one’s entire being, including
one’s body, one’s physical existence, is present, is
bounded, is distinct from the other and has remained
so through some duration of time. One may also use self
to refer to the psyche and its mental faculties, including
intentionality, personhood, ego, persona, feelings, and
unconscious processes—perhaps also soul—and so
forth, which are distinct from the mental faculties of
the other, and that have remained the same “mind”
through some considerable duration of time. The degree
of distinction between self-as-being and self-as-psyche
depends upon the extent to which one is enculturated
(the process by which a baby grows up to be inculcated
with his or her society’s skills, values, attitudes, and
knowledge) to believe that there exists a mind-body
dualism—that is, the belief that mind and body are
two different substances, levels, metaphysical planes,
domains, and so forth. If I say “I went there myself,” I
will usually mean that my entire physical being moved
there, that I was there in both body and mind. However,
an Australian Aborigine might say something in her
language that is similar to “I went there myself,” but
actually mean that she traveled there in her dream state.
For the Australian Aborigine, the distinction between
self-as-being and self-as-psyche is not as extreme as it is
for most Westerners, yet she would certainly know that
she had left her body behind while she traveled as her
spirit-self, her “soul.” Indeed, she may well report that
she had met others during her dream journey who had
likewise left their physical forms behind, if they still had
physical forms—were not perhaps ghosts of departed
relatives (see Laughlin, 2011). The distinction between
self-as-being and self-as-psyche is sometimes subtle and
often muddled in anthropological writings, one reason
being that although the self-concept (self-construal,
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self-representation) is a cultural universal (i.e., people
everywhere make the distinction between self and nonself or other), how different peoples understand the
self can vary enormously (Spiro, 1993). It is the task of
ethnology (i.e., the scientific study of culture) to unpack
differences and similarities among the ways people come
to know what they know about themselves, their society,
and their world. The thing to keep in mind is that
anthropologists of whatever age have almost always been
concerned with self-as-psyche, not self-as-being.
Anthropology of the Self
t is commonplace in anthropology to maintain that
the Western (i.e., Euro-American-Aussie) cultural
concept of the self is somewhat different, perhaps even
aberrant, when compared with the majority of nonWestern peoples (Geertz, 1984; Markus & Kitayama,
1991). Westerners do tend to cognize the self as an
independent, distinct, separate, and autonomous
individual, while most traditional peoples conceive of
themselves as interdependent, as social actors whose
identities derive from their position in a social network—
as cogs in the social wheel. It is also the case that most
people in all societies identify themselves with their
culturally defined self-concept (social-self or ego), rather
than the self as it really is (see Spiro, 1993). However, the
Western vs. non-Western conception of the self is not a
simple black and white contrast, for there are people in
each type of society that may be found to exhibit the
style of self-construal of the other (Hollan, 1992; Mpofu,
1994). Thus any scientific definition of the self must be
amenable to a range of sociocultural variation broader
than is normally modeled in Western psychology.
To one extent or another, ethnology has been
interested in the social and cultural aspects of the self
since the discipline’s inception as a science in the mid19th century. The reason for this is the obvious ubiquity
of ethnopsychologies (local theories of mind) among
the planet’s peoples. As Paul Heelas (1981a) noted:
“Indigenous psychologies are in fact necessary if three
interrelated functions are to be fulfilled: sustaining
the ‘inner’ self, sustaining the self with respect to the
sociocultural, and enabling sociocultural institutions
to operate” (p. 13). In other words, human beings
everywhere are curious about themselves and develop
personal knowledge both through direct experience
and through the internalization of the society’s norms,
self-concepts, and categories. The principal interest of
the anthropology of the self is in understanding how
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the developing individual constructs his or her identity
within the context of physical and social environment.
One fundamental impact of a cross-cultural view is
that the definition of the self as used by psychology and
interdisciplinary transpersonalists should conform to
how it may be applied in other non-Western societies.
In other words, the definition one uses should reflect
the fact that all societies have words for and concepts of
the self, but that how the concept is instantiated in each
culture may vary, as it will among individuals making
up the group.
Factors in the Cross-Cultural Understanding
of the Self
There are other factors that become evident in
the cross-cultural literature, and I will discuss each of
them in turn, giving examples from the ethnographic
literature and adding some relevant literature in case the
reader wishes to follow-up. Sensitivity to these factors will
allow interdisciplinary transpersonalists to better utilize
the ethnographic literature in their formulations. For
instance, knowing that so-called lucid dreaming is quite
common in many societies should temper discussions of
lucid dreaming as an unusual experience among Western
subjects and how such subjects conceive of the dreamself (Laughlin, 2011).
Self-as-being versus self-as-psyche. Virtually
all anthropological treatments pertain to the self-aspsyche, as opposed to the self-as-being, as described
above. Perhaps as many as 95% or more of uses of the
term in the anthropological literature are concerned with
the psychological dimensions of personhood, identity,
role, status, and so on, rather than the greater existential
sense of “being in the world” (i.e., existence, Heideggerian
dasein; Heiddeger (1953/1996). Keeping this distinction
in mind may help in processing ethnographic data in
the context of interdisciplinary transpersonal studies
wherein writers often imply self-as-being in their
research methods and analyses. Indeed, transpersonal
research often requires a developmental shift from a selfawareness locked into a culturally defined social identity
to a transcendent awareness of being (e.g., Barušs, 2003).
The people living on Saburl Island near New
Guinea make a distinction typical of traditional peoples,
and to some extent modern technocratic nations as
well—that being the difference between someone who is
physically human and someone who is morally human,
the latter being defined as an individual who knows the
“rules of sociality” (Battaglia, 1990, p. 55). The process by

which one becomes a moral human is a trick of memory
in which the disparate experiences one has and stories one
hears suddenly coagulate into one understanding. The
stories become one story, and one finds grounding for
one’s social self. By inculcating the lessons of experience
and stories, one realizes a self that is fully Saberl—that
being, one who is capable of participating in a flowing,
meaningful, and unobstructed social discourse.
Self-as-experienced and self-as-reported. A
close reading of the ethnographic literature makes one
aware of a distinction that is often poorly operationalized.
That is the distinction between self-as-experienced
and self-as-reported, or to put it in other words, how I
experience myself from moment to moment and how I
talk about myself in public (Hallowell, 1955; Hollan,
1992). The ethnographic literature often seems to equate
self with self-concept, self-knowledge, and personhood—
the self as described in language (e.g., Battaglia, 1995;
Goddard, 1996). Limiting research to the ways that
people talk about themselves and others: (1) slants the data
in favor of the typical constructivist bias, for people are
influenced by rules of appropriate linguistic production
and etiquette and may be reporting in terms of cultural
models as opposed to personal phenomenology (Throop,
2000), and (2) leads to ethnographers ignoring or downplaying the vast depths of the transcendental self—the
psyche each individual is culturally conditioned to
model. Thus, ethnographic research that is limited to
recording how people customarily talk about themselves
is often psychodynamically shallow and of limited
importance to transpersonal studies. Moreover, because
different non-Western peoples talk about the self,
personhood, social identity, and consciousness in myriad
different ways, it is difficult to compare cognitions across
cultures, or to isolate those aspects of the transcendental
self that may be universal to the species (Erchak, 1992).
It should be remembered that language hides as much or
more than it reveals about experience (see Weiner, 2001)
and may easily gloss over non-linguistic factors involved
in self-awareness and self-understanding, which may
be more fluid, universal, and developmental than selfreports may describe.
Another way to view this issue clearly is to make
a distinction between public and private self (see Heelas,
1981b, p. 43). People often express that there is more
to themselves than others know. In fact, they often say
“nobody knows me.” That means that they are not getting
feedback about themselves that matches what they know
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about themselves. Again, anthropology has most often
focused upon the public self: the social identity, persona,
public ego, and so forth.
The embodiment of self. More modern
anthropological conceptions of the self have insisted
upon its embodiment. Following on from Hallowell’s
(1955) pioneering work, Thomas Csordas (1994) argued
that the only perspective that fits cross-cultural findings
is an experiential-phenomenological one that recognizes
the self as an amalgamation of “prereflective bodily
experience, culturally constituted world or milieu, and
situational specificity or habitus” (p. 5). The various
somatic processes orient the being to the world—
processes mediating perception and action (“practice”)—
and exist prior to self-reflection and cultural conditioning
(see Powers, 2005). The fundamental function of the
self is orientational; that is, the essential and embodied
processes of the self operate to orient the being toward
objects and events in the world, toward the social
other, and toward oneself as the center of an existential
situation. In reflexively objectifying the self, one creates
the fiction of personhood, an identity influenced by
culture and projected outwards upon society.
I do not mean to imply that all non-Western
societies exhibit the extreme mind-body dualism typical
of technocratic societies. Far from it, for many cultures
see the self as a physical entity. For instance, while the
Muinane people of Columbia speak of themselves in
much the egoistic terms Westerners do, their ontological
assumptions about the self are as a physical substance,
or, to put it in other words, they do not posit a clear
distinction between thought and act, both being part
of the same physical process (Londoño-Sulkin, 2000).
Muinane are enculturated to pursue a way of life they
consider “cool,” and remaining cool requires cool
thoughts—like, loving their kinsmen, avoiding improper
intentions, showing respect for others, working hard,
and so forth. Evil is produced by people and other beings
that are “hot,” meaning egotistical, self-serving, angry,
and morally ignorant. A hot person is transformed into
a cool one by the ritual manipulation of the substances
causing such anti-social and dangerous tendencies.
Nor should I leave the reader with the
misconception that just because a people conceive of
the self as a substance, that the substance fits a Western
category of physical “matter.” Indeed, few peoples are
materialistic in that way. One of the most common
conceptions of self and body is that people, just like all

other things in the world, are essentially made up of an
élan vital, or vital force. The Navajo speak of that force
in terms of “wind” (McNeley, 1981). The Holy Wind
is a single force that pervades everything in the world.
Hence, everything (including people) is implicated in
everything else. This is a common view among African
peoples who conceive of this force or energy in the
person as interpenetrating with that of others, and with
all things (Horton, 1983; Morris, 1994). The African
ontology is quite similar to that among Pacific peoples
who hold to various conceptions of “mana” as a living,
vital force in and between persons (Keesing, 1984).
Egoistic versus social self. Personhood never
develops in a social vacuum. One develops a self-concept
in relation to others among whom one is raised. All people
everywhere experience themselves as both individual and
social actor (Mageo, 1995, 1998). But in many societies,
the sense of self develops so thoroughly bound to family
and community relations that people have a difficult
time considering the self apart from society (as in the
case of the Muinane above). Among the Cashinahua of
Western Amazonia, people make a distinction between
a normal person who craves interaction with his kin and
a being they call a yuxin who has no fixed place in the
world (Lagrou, 2000, p. 159).
Moreover, all normal (i.e., non-psychopathic)
individuals acknowledge the personhood of the other in
every encounter. As George Murdock (1945) noted, every
culture on the planet demarcates encounters with the
other with ritual hellos and goodbyes (see also Gregor,
1977, for a case in point among the Mehinaku of Brazil).
Moreover, the vast majority of societies encourage the
developing person to conceive of themselves in socially
pragmatic ways (Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2010;
Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Whom I conceive myself to
be as a person, as an identity, as a self-image, persona or
ego, is coterminous with my social status, my role(s) in
the social fabric, and my position in the family, lineage,
and clan, as well as any ritual exchange network with
which I am involved. Gender is always a factor, of course.
As Gerald Erchak (1992, pp. 59-61) noted, all human
societies exaggerate gender differences. I might add that
gender categories are often some of the most rigidly held
in defining social identity. At the moment, the cultures
of the technocratic world are undergoing a profound gay,
lesbian, bisexual, transgender (GLBT) revolution, which
reveals just how rigid or flexible traditional gender roles
can be.
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The role I play in the political and economic
structure of the group is entirely entangled with my
conception of social context. While knowing that I am
distinct as an entity, a person, I nonetheless define myself
in my relation to others. In a very real sense, people are
symbols to one another, and even symbols to oneself
(Stromberg, 1985). When people encounter one another
through the mediation of social categories (male vs.
female, higher status vs. lower status, authority vs. peer
group member, etc.), they are conditioned to alter how
they present in the encounter. They are often performing
who they are on a socially appropriate stage (Battaglia,
1990, 1995). This cross-culturally common situation
involves self-construal: internalizing during development
the historical narrative, social statuses and roles, and
the system of reciprocal obligations and responsibilities
in which the individual is embedded, as well as the
projection of social categories and expectations upon
the other. These relations and reciprocal obligations may
extend into cosmological domains, including backwards
into my culture’s cosmogony (Mageo, 2001a, pp. 4-6)
and into my present or past interactions with other-thanhuman persons, as Hallowell (1955, 2010) liked to call
spiritual beings (i.e., with ancestors, totemic spirits, gods,
etc.; Block & Parry, 1982).
Martin Sökefeld (1999) made the point that
modern anthropology recognizes that traditional
societies are made up of a plurality of selves. Culture does
influence the development of self-identity, but this does
not mean that identities are stamped out by some kind
of cultural cookie-cutter. Indeed, as he illustrated among
the people living in the town of Gilgit in Northern
Pakistan, identities quite often come into conflict.
Individuals under the stress of social involvement may
be forced to embrace a number of identities, and some of
these identities may even conflict with each other.
Sameness and duration of self. A person’s selfidentity is almost always seen as an enduring process
(Sökefeld, 1999). Even though the self may change
through time—may grow, develop, evolve, mature,
transcend the limits of social categories, and eventually
die—there is the sense that I remain the same enduring
object or process over time. For instance, anthropologists
will speak of “life-history” durations of selfhood (e.g.,
Cole & Knowles, 2001; Thomas, 2005), and again, the
duration of the self may continue on after death into
ancestorhood (Royce, 2011). Those societies that believe
the person is reincarnated may consider aspects of the

self to pre-date conception and to continue lifetime after
lifetime, if only as a bundle of karma (Block & Parry,
1982).
In addition, the self not only has agency, it is the
product of agency (Bourdieu, 1977; Brockelman, 1985;
Sökefeld, 1999). In either case, the human self is marked
by the capacity to bind time in both its development
and in its intentions (Piaget, 1980). The self takes time
to develop because it is the product of the interaction
between the individual and the social and physical
world, and the self may project its intentions into the
distant future by way of planned actions that may take
time to come to fruition. Hence, it is obvious that the
role of memory in construing a social self or self-identity
is fundamental to the process (Ben-Āmôs & Weissberg,
1999; Mageo, 2001b, p. 15). A clear example of this factor
may be found in Marianne George’s (1988) description of
the importance of mounting and participation in rituals
that transform the status of people of power among
the Barok living on the island of New Ireland in Papua
New Guinea. For Barok “big men,” certain major rituals
not only mark the transformation of personal power,
the years-long effort in mounting the ritual actually
produces the transformation. This is apparently typical
of Melanesian rituals of exchange in that they operate
to change egoistic motivations into social regard (Gow,
2000, p. 48).
The lifetime process of self-development may
be socially punctuated by phases of transformation
demarked by ritual, so-called rites of passage (Turner,
1967, 1969; van Gennep, 1909/1960). For example,
transformation in a person’s social status and power
is often accomplished during such rituals (Burns &
Laughlin, 1979). Ritual transformations typically result
in both public and self-referential changes in one’s
personhood. Male members of the Sambia tribe of the
New Guinea highlands are forced through a series of
brutal initiations, which, according to Gilbert Herdt
(1982), transform each male’s identity from a dependent,
female dominated sense of self in early childhood to that
of a fierce warrior who represses his feminine side and
defines himself in opposition to women so that he may
effectively fight wars and copulate with captured and
presumably hostile women.
Self and emotion. The self includes emotional
as well as perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral attributes
(Laughlin & Throop, 1999; Markus & Kitayama 2003;
Overing & Passes, 2002b; Throop 2000). Indeed,
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the control of emotion may be fundamental to how
individuals are conditioned to present themselves in
social situations. All too often anthropologists treat
the building of self-construal as though it is strictly a
cognitive-linguistic process. However, the self-as-psyche
includes not only what I think and imagine about myself
and the other, but also what I feel about myself and the
other. C. G. Jung (1955, p. 138 [CW 18 para. 318];
1978, pp. 329-330 (CW 5 para. 507]) taught that one
comes to know oneself by watching the emotionallyladen attributes one shares with, and that one projects
upon, other people. Emotions are contagious, as is
inevitable in a social species; people tend to be drawn
into the emotional tone of the group. Moreover, people
tend to confound their own unconscious attributes with
the perceived attributes of the other. This quite natural
process of projection plays a significant role in the
construction of a social self.
The role of emotion is fundamental to one’s
sense of self in many societies. Brian P. Farley (1998)
has shown the role of anxiety in constructing a sense of
self among the Nahuatl-speaking people living in the
village of San Bartolomé Guahuixmatlac in the state of
Tlaxcala, Mexico:

Indeed, for a person to exhibit willfulness in pursuit of
their own desires may invite systematic and negative
sanctions. Among Malayan peoples, there is pressure to
deport oneself so as to not appear foolish or contrary,
and thus avoid feeling shame (Goddard, 1996). In
virtually all societies, the socially appropriate sense
of self involves controlling the expression of negative
feelings, especially anger (Overing & Passes, 2002a, p.
22). See: Gaffin (1995) for the Faeroe Islanders of the
North Atlantic who recognize a type of person called a
rukkur, “an easily angered fool;” Briggs (1970) for the
Utku Inuit of the arctic for whom reason is valued above
all emotions, and those who show anger are ostracized;
and Harris (1978) for the Taita people of Kenya who,
recognizing the destructive effects of anger, have rituals

for purifying negative emotions. Indeed, so prevalent is
this stricture on showing negative emotions that it has
led Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama (1999) to
suggest there is a universal bias in cultural conditioning
toward positive self-regard.
Self-system. There has been a gradual realization in anthropology that the self is less an entity
than it is a complex psycho-physical system, which may
trend towards unity or fragmentation (e.g., Csordas,
1994, p. 276), depending on personal, developmental,
social, and environmental pressures, especially during
a person’s formative years (Mageo, 1995, 1998, 2002b).
The self-system (as Jeannette Mageo aptly called it) is
organic and therefore it develops, grows, and changes
over time. When speaking of the self in this way—from
the phenomenological point of view the only sensible
perspective—one is talking about arguably the most
complex system in the known universe. As with any
organic system, there are developmental factors that
are all-important in understanding how the system
comes to be structured and operate in its adult form
(Bourguignon, 1989; Mageo, 1995).
Self-body dualism. Cross-cultural research has
shown that virtually all societies on the planet conceive
of the self and the body to be separable to some extent.
In a research project some of my students and I carried
out some years ago, we asked some questions about
mind-body relations of a standard holographic sample
of societies from around the world (see full report at
Laughlin, n.d.). We found that although many societies
evidence a more unitary view of mind-body relations
than Westerners do, virtually all societies have some
notion of mind being distinct from body, if nothing
more than they experience leaving their body and
traveling around in their dreams. In other words, mindbody dualism ranges from minimal to extreme, but
is nonetheless a cultural universal. The importance of
this finding for explanations of notions of immortality
cannot be overemphasized. The phenomenological gap
suggests to a person’s mind that their consciousness
is somehow separate from their corporeal nature, and
that the mind, or some part of the mind, may continue
to exist, in some sense, “long after the frail corporeal
envelope which lodged it for a time has moldered in the
dust” (Frazer, 1933/1966, p. 3).
Multi-state self. One of the most important
findings in ethnology for transpersonal studies is that
for most traditional societies, people develop their
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I argue that the sociocentric-oriented self as
developed in San Bartolomé experiences deep
emotional conflicts and strong resentment toward
others. Individuals subordinate their own interests to
collective purposes because they experience anxiety
in association with their own drives and desires and
fear retaliation from either social contemporaries or
supernatural beings. (p. 272)

identity in part from information they derive while
in alternative states of consciousness (ASCs), that is,
experiences had while dreaming, having visions and
mystical states, on drug trips, and participating in rituals
(Bourguignon, 1973; Bourguignon & Evascu, 1977;
Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili 1990;
Winkelman, 2010). The distinction between these kinds
of societies and those of the Western world (usually
modern technocratic societies), where ASCs are either
not encountered or ignored in identity formation, is
critical. For this reason, two types of culture are defined:
monophasic cultures in which knowledge of self and world
tends to be derived from what Westerners think of as
“normal waking” experiences, and polyphasic cultures
in which knowledge of self and world is derived from
multiple states of consciousness (see Laughlin et al.,
1990). The latter type characterizes the vast majority of
the planet’s societies.
Certain states of consciousness are more easily
influenced by normally unconscious processes than
others. This is particularly true of dream life and is
why dream work is vitally important in many types of
psychotherapy and in advanced Jungian individuation
(Hillman, 1987). Hence it follows that the construal of
self among polyphasic peoples may be quite different—
and some have argued potentially more productive of
advanced, holistic self-development—than that among,
say, modern Westerners whose protean ego development
may thwart advanced self-realization. This factor is
evident in the extent of control the dream ego may
exercise in the dream life. For most Westerners and
monophasic peoples, generally, dreams just kind of
happen, usually without any exercise of will on the part
of the ego. Among many polyphasic societies, however,
people routinely travel at will in their dreams. This is a
particularly important skill learned by certain shamans
who may seek socially vital information and healing
power in the dream world (Laughlin, 2011).
Transcendental versus cognized self. Peoples
vary as to the extent to which they distinguish between
culturally influenced self-construal and the recognition
of the self as a transcendental object, system, or field
(Jung, 1968b, p. 181 [CW 12 para. 247]). Some cultures
hold that the culturally inculcated empirical ego is
merely a reflection of the true, mysterious and mystical
self that is either ultimately unknowable, or knowable
by only a few advanced individuals (shamans, seers,
mystics, etc.; see Winkelman, 2010). Ethnographies

will sometimes confound the term self with other terms
such as identity, personhood, personality, ego, being,
subjectivity, ethnicity, and self-construal (Erchak, 1992,
p. 8). As I have said, what most anthropologists are
referring to is the way a people talk about themselves
relative to the other (either to other persons or other
groups), to their social position and status, or to their
role with respect to their cosmology. There are some
societies in which the development of the self is thought
to pass through multiple stages, usually involving a
person’s comprehension of and participation in the
society’s spiritual life (e.g., see Jorgensen, 1980, for the
Telefolmin, and Barth, 1975, for the Baktaman, both of
New Guinea).
Transpersonal self-construal. Mara, DeCicco,
& Stroink (2010) have suggested the term metapersonal
self-construal for societies recognizing transpersonal
development. Metapersonal self-construal “is defined
as a sense of one’s identity that extends beyond the
individual or personal to encompass wider aspects of
humankind, life, psyche, or the cosmos” (DeCicco &
Stroink, 2007, p. 84). Again:
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The focus of an individual with this self-construal
moves beyond personal and relational views of the
self to a more universal view. In other words, the
metapersonal self-construal is not simply defined by
personal attributes or social relations, but instead
defines the self as connected to all things. The
metapersonal has a universal focus that includes all
life and nature into the concept of the self. (Mara et
al., pp. 1-2).
The ethnographic literature is rife with cultures that
not only recognize a metapersonal dimension to the
self, but actively encourage self-realization and peak
experiences of self in relation to the world (LaHood,
2007; Laughlin, 1989, 1994a, 1994b, 2001; Laughlin,
McManus, & Shearer, 1993). In many of these cases, the
distinction between self-as-being and self-as-psyche not
only becomes blurred, it may well be culturally irrelevant
(Bateson, 1980).
Broadening the Definition of the Self
In summary, modern ethnology tends to
encounter local conceptions of the self as embodied,
as a system: (1) that perceptually orients the individual
toward both the social and physical world and the inner
being, and (2) that guides intentional action. The self
is not an entity—not the product of a constructivist

cookie-cutter mechanism—but does develop a model of
itself through adaptive development and self-reflection.
The product is a self-concept or identity that may be
pluralistic and even protean, that is inextricably linked
to emotion, and that is strongly influenced by cultural
categories (such as age, sex, status, role, spirit, soul,
morality, etc.). Cultures generally recognize that the self
is plastic and that it develops with age, sometimes passing
through culturally recognized maturational phases that
may be demarked or facilitated by rituals. Some societies
also recognize higher, transpersonal dimensions of selfdevelopment, which perhaps only a few individuals in
the group ever attain.
Self from a Neuroanthropological Standpoint
Anthropological and neuropsychological
approaches are not only compatible, it is clear that they
are mutually supportive and paint similar pictures of
the self (see Kitayama & Park, 2010). This is especially
true when more introspective or experiential methods
are used in ethnology. This is not surprising, for the
structure(s) of the self are the neurophysiological
networks that mediate awareness, personality, emotion,
cognition, imagery, point of view, temporal perspective,
planning, social identity, and all the other attributes
of the self as described by ethnographers. Thus, a
neuroanthropological perspective on the self is possibly
the most powerful window one has on human nature. So
let me finally define self in a way that is amenable to both
neuroscience and anthropology.
From the neuroanthropological standpoint,
the self is comprised of those neurophysiological
structures that mediate the psyche, including those
specialized networks that produce self-reflection. Self
is a distributed system of neural networks, some of
which are more common to experience than others.
Because it is made up of living cells, the self-system is
organic and dynamic, and changes its organization
from moment to moment depending upon the focus of
consciousness. The biological function of the self is to
orient mental functions to those aspects of the world
that are of adaptive significance, including the physical
environment, the social milieu, and internal somatic
and psychological states. All animals with brains have a
self-system, however rudimentary. Primates, being social
animals, are focused on social relations that play a major
role in neuropsychological development. Most of the
neural activities comprising the self at any given moment
are unconscious, and some operations are either rarely

or never conscious. Self-system states normally include
elements of emotion and perhaps praxis, appropriate to
the adaptational problem being faced.
One of the most important functions of the self is
in observing and modeling itself. As the great perceptual
psychologist, James J. Gibson (1979; Neisser, 1993)
showed, self-perception is a special case of perception
in general in that one’s being, one’s body, is part of
the extramental world to which the brain must adapt.
The cognition of the self is no different in this respect
than the cognition of any other object. Just how the self
presents to self-awareness and how one makes sense of
those presentations are heavily mediated by culture. As
psychological anthropologist Larry Peters (1994) has
shown, the “symptoms” of mental illness as interpreted
by clinicians in a Western technocratic culture may be
seen as indications of the need for a rite of passage and
self-transformation in a non-Western context.
Self-reflection, mediated primarily by cortical
structures in the prefrontal lobes, is probably a
more advanced facility among humans than any
other animal on the planet. It is small wonder that
anthropologists encounter the range of customary selfconstrual represented in the ethnographic literature.
Anthropologists have traditionally emphasized the
sociocultural factors influencing the development of
personality, social identity, maturation of social role,
alterations in consciousness, autobiographical narratives,
behavior, how people talk about themselves, and so forth.
More recent studies (e.g., Hollan, 1992; Mageo, 1995;
Throop, 2000) have more fully recognized the systemic
and reflexive nature of the self, but none so far have
grounded the self-system in neurobiology. If one includes
neurophysiological grounding—if one acknowledges
that the self is a distinct organization of the brain—it
becomes obvious that there is always far more to the selfsystem than any cognitive model or self-concept, a factor
rarely acknowledged in most anthropological studies.
There is also a growing understanding that the selfsystem is not necessarily unitary, that sub-systems may
be in conflict with each other. There may exist recurrent
contingencies that require a fragmented adaptation
during the development of the self.
For phenomenological reasons (see Laughlin
& Throop, 2009), it is easy for people to ignore the
embodied nature of mind, consciousness, and even the
self, and to conclude that there exists (to one extent
or another) an ontological distinction between mind
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(psyche, self, soul, etc.) and the physical body. In other
words, local cultural epistemologies are hampered by
the very structure and operations of the nervous system
in reaching a complete identity theory of mind-body
relations, or in understanding the full complexity of the
self-system. Being cognizant that the self-system is vastly
complex, most of its operations remaining unconscious to
actors, allows one to realize that the self is transcendental
relative to any possible knowledge one may accrue about
it. It is also clear that there exists no cultural tradition
that fully models the self-system in anything like the
complexity of modern neuroscience. Simply put, the
human nervous system is the most complex system in
the known universe, and there is no end to what one may
come to know about its operations, most of which are
amenable only to scientific scrutiny.
Unfortunately, there so far exists no widely
accepted anthropological theory that can accommodate
a transpersonal, transcultural, or archetypal view of the
self (cf. Daniels, 2002, for a summary of theories in
transpersonal psychology). For various reasons too arcane
to go into here, psychological anthropology has historically
been heavily influenced by Freudian psychoanalysis
while virtually ignoring Jungian psychology (Laughlin
& Tiberia, 2012). Were anthropologists more aware of
Jungian complex, or analytical psychology (Jung, 1968a, p.
40 [CW 9 pt. 1 para. 84]), they would know that over a
century ago Jung taught that the psyche is a vast system
of subsystems and sub-subsystems, termed complexes,
most of which remain unconscious to the person (Jung,
1973b, p. 599 [CW 2 para. 1351]), and which are redolent
with emotional associations (Jung, 1973a, p. 321 [CW 2
para. 733]).
The self is merely a term that designates the whole
personality. The whole personality of man is
indescribable. His consciousness can be described,
his unconscious cannot be described because the
unconscious—and here I must repeat myself—is
always unconscious. It is really unconscious, we really
don’t know it, so we don’t know our unconscious
personality. We have hints, we have certain ideas,
but we don’t know it really. . . . The unconscious of
man can go God knows where. There we are going
to make discoveries. (Jung, as cited in McGuire &
Hull, 1977, p. 301)

for the self to develop more than one ego-complex.
Psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton (1971, 1999) came close
to the Jungian view when he described what he called
protean man, a self-system with more than one egocomplex, each complex being adaptive in a specific
set of circumstances. This type of fragmentation is
characteristic of selves that develop under stressful
conditions such as poverty, social conflict, domestic and
social violence, and so forth. Protean development is a
significant hindrance to the natural tendency of the self
toward totality or wholeness.
The empirical (i.e., the phenomenologically
accessible) “hints” about the nature of the unconscious
are derived from intuitive ideas, images, unintended
actions, and so forth that may be the objects of selfreflection. One may learn something of one’s unconscious
self via dreams, visions, free associations, mythopoeic
creativity, and other alternative states of consciousness.
The unconscious is composed of endless archetypal
structures which, although never observed directly,
may be known to some extent from watching their
operations (Laughlin & Tiberia, 2012; Stevens, 1982).
For neuroanthropological purposes, the terms neural
network and archetype may be treated as synonymous
when and if the neural network mediates part of the
personality. Everyone is born with a self-system, with an
archetypal self.
The Transcendental Self
Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas (“Fortunate
is he, who is able to know the causes of things.”)
Virgil (29 BC, The Georgics, Book II, verse 490)
You cannot step into the same river twice, for fresh
waters are ever flowing in upon you. Heraclitus
(lines 41-42, as cited in Burnet (1930), Early Greek
Philosophy)

O

Jung’s view was that the empirical ego is but
one complex out of a multitude, and it is entirely possible

ne of the most important attributes of selfreflection is that its operations may, under the
requisite conditions, change one’s self-construal, and
thus potentially change the organization of the self.
This process is what Harris L. Friedman (2013; Pappas
& Friedman, 2012) has called self-expansiveness, the
transformation of the self-concept as a direct consequence
of transpersonal experiences and explorations. This
is a very useful concept for anthropology, as well as
psychology, for it points to an attribute of spiritual
development common in polyphasic cultures in which
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transpersonal experiences are evoked using ritual and
psychoactive drugs. Again, the concept underscores
the phenomenological fact that there is no little “me”
floating around above the self, objectively watching what
is happening. Self-reflection is a thoroughly subjective
process by which the self-system monitors its own
operations.
It is crucial to understand that, just as the
self and world are transcendental relative to one’s
knowledge, so too is the physical body. One never
experiences one’s body as it really is. The extramental
body is vastly complex. Yet one can be aware of the body
only through exteroceptive (vision hearing, touch, etc.)
and interoceptive sensations (pain, bliss, proprioception,
etc.) and the self-model and self-image one informs from
those sensations. The cognized body is a model of the
real thing, and is constructed by neural networks that are
“wired-in”—modeled by what Kinsbourne (1998) has
called a “body-scheme-acquisition device” (p. 215) and
a “body-image-acquisition device” (p. 216). Obviously,
culture can impact this modeling process by varying
the experiences one has of the body. For instance, an
advanced practitioner of hatha yoga may develop a
different model of their body than non-practitioners.
Anthropologist Paul Radin (1927) suggested
decades ago that in any given society, one would find
a handful of critical thinkers, or philosophers, while
everyone else simply accepted their cultural worldview
as received—Radin called these men of action. It may
well be, then, that most people in any culture will tend
to project their self-concept and self-image onto their
transcendental self, thereby mistaking, as Jung (1969,
pp. 269-270 [CW 8 para. 516]) noted, the concept
or image for the object. Belief in a permanent me is a
matter of self-deceptive attitude, which is instilled in
childhood (Hood, 2012) and altered by culture, and
potentially by experience. It seems likely that societies
range along a continuum from those that discourage too
much self-reflection to those that positively sanction, or
even mandate more advanced self-reflection. The point
is, from an empirical view, all that is required to realize
the impermanence and illusion of the self-concept, or
any mental function with which the self is identified, is a
sufficient level of self-reflection (often during the course
of meditation). In a sense, the human brain is wired to
potentially realize itself as it really is—that virtually all
psychological functions of the brain are impermanent
(Austin, 1999; Flanagan, 2011).

The Relevance of No-Self
There is no better example of the transformational
capacity of self-reflection than the realization of no-self,
that is, the realization that there is no such thing as
a permanent ego. The belief in a permanent ego is an
artifact of cultural conditioning and is easily dispelled
by self-reflection as long as the individual does not overly
identify with his or her self-model. It is safe to say that
any cultural tradition that encourages self-reflection as a
path to self-knowledge and wisdom will lead inevitably
to “seeing” that the self is dynamic and that nothing that
arises in consciousness is permanent. This is not a matter
of taste, but of seeing the self as it really is—indeed, as a
transcendental self-system as described above.
The most famous tradition of self-reflection
leading to this realization, and the elevation of that
realization to a cornerstone of philosophy, is the Buddhist
doctrine of anatta (no-self, selflessness; see Austin, 1999;
Carlisle, 2006; Collins, 1982; Federman, 2011; Flanagan,
2011, pp. 93-98; Harvey, 1995; Metzinger, 2009;
Morris, 1994; Smith, 2010). In Theravada Buddhism,
the realization of anatta is automatic on the path to
awakening. In a famous treatise on insight meditation,
the great Burmese meditation master, Mahāsi Sayādaw
(1994), noted that the belief in a permanent ego falls
away during stage four of a 19 stage maturation process
leading to the realization of Nibbāna and the fruits of
that realization. What the discourse obviously implies is
that personal identification with a fixed and permanent
self-model is common to all people everywhere, even
in Buddhist societies. This is a point that ethnographer
Melford Spiro (1993) made about his Burmese Buddhist
informants. When he went into the field among Burmese
Buddhists, and aware of the central teaching of anatta,
he wished to see how that teaching of no-self (no-soul)
influenced peoples’ self-understanding:
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After a few months into my field work, however,
it became apparent that I would have to change
my research plans because I discovered that the
Burmese villagers with whom I lived and worked
do not internalize the doctrine of anatta. Instead,
they strongly believe in the very ego or soul that
this doctrine denies. They do so on two accounts,
experiential and pragmatic. First, because they
themselves experience a subjective sense of a self, the
culturally normative concept of an ego-less person
does not correspond to their personal experience.

Spiro’s findings among the Burmese mirror my own
among Tibetan Buddhist monks. The realization of noself is exceptional in any society, even those whose local
epistemology or ethnopsychology describe the emptiness
of the transcendental self. Tibetan Buddhist monks may
learn texts by heart that extol the virtues of realizing noself (the anatman), few actually practice the advanced
meditations leading to this realization.
Practitioners of Western philosophical and
spiritual traditions have reached the same conclusion based
upon meditations focusing upon the empirical contents
of the “empirical” ego. The great phenomenologist,
Edmund Husserl (1989, pp. 103-104), concluded from his
introspection that the ego is essentially empty of content
and is really no more than an enduring point of view
upon ever-changing content. The ego is an ineluctable
focus of intentionality toward the world of experience
(Husserl, 1969, p. 23). A meditator inevitably comes to
this conclusion because he or she finds that every content
she focuses upon as me—as self—is impermanent; that
is, all contents arise and pass away within the sphere of
consciousness, hence, the “you can’t step in the same
river twice” metaphor above. All that remains of my self
is an enduring point of view always present within the
stream of consciousness, a point of view that is devoid of
content, and yet is identical to the unity of each moment
of consciousness (Husserl, 1970, p. 545).
Meditation and the Transcendental Self
Meditation is essentially the disciplined turning
of the spotlight of consciousness upon the internal
processes of the transcendental self. It is clear now from
research on the neuropsychology of meditation that the
process is one of reorganization of the self (Damasio,
2003, 2010; Deshmukh, 2006; Varela & Shear, 1999;
Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). A self-aware self is
different both experientially and structurally than a nonaware self. Indeed, awareness of self is mediated differently
than awareness of the other (Decety & Sommerville,
2003). The introspective mind-state is mediated by
a discrete organization in the brain (Heatherton et
al., 2006), and as that system of networks develops
through disciplined application of self-awareness, it
grows and reorganizes (Goldberg, Harel, & Malach,
2006; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001;

Murphy & Donovan, 1999). As more is learned about
how the brain mediates its own self-reflection, there is a
concomitant and growing realization among researchers
of the value of introspective, phenomenological, and
meditative research in science (Tart, 2001; Wallace,
2007, 2009).
Conclusion
pproaching the nature and experience of the self from
a transpersonal neuroanthropological perspective
will help both transpersonal and ethnological researchers
avoid some of the pitfalls of more constructivist views of
social identity. More specifically, combining ethnographic
fieldwork with neuropsychological research underscores
the systematic nature of the self. Traditional cultures
exhibit myriad ways of conceiving, conceptualizing,
imaging, and talking about the self (Wexler, 2006).
These ways of knowing are usually focused upon the
socially active person and emphasize the ways that
societies have of encouraging self-identity (or culturally
conditioned model of the self). From an ecological
point of view (Gibson, 1979; Neisser, 1993), one can
best understand that self-construal is an adaptational
process no different than adaptation to other aspects
of extramental reality. Enduring social relations require
that there be a consensus, habitual and customary
understanding of the social person, and each individual
must more or less conform to social expectations in order
to, so to speak, “go along to get along.”
But many cultures also recognize that such selfmodels are incomplete and transitory, at least implicitly
reflecting the mysterious and transcendental reality of
the true self. By realizing that most of what the brain
does occurs unconsciously, including processes integral
to the psyche and self, the researcher cannot fall into
the error of mistaking the self-concept for the true
self. Moreover, understanding that neurophysiological
systems mediating the self both develop over the course
of the life span and are to some extent plastic in their
organization, forces the researcher’s perspective into a
broader and more dynamic standpoint.
It is reasonable to posit that the more pressure
there is in a society for people to conform to a fixed
and shared concept of the social (economic, political)
self, the less the culture will recognize and encourage
transpersonal explorations. On the other hand, one
of the tipoffs that a society does encourage such
explorations is that they will apply rituals to that end:
for example, the Sun Dance among Native Americans,
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Second, and perhaps more important, they find the
doctrine of selfless person not congenial to their
soteriological aspirations. (p. 119)

A

ritualized meditations among Buddhist practitioners,
the ritualized ingestion of psychoactive substances (or
entheogens) among shamanic cultures, the Sema dance
among Sufis, and so forth. The point of all such ritual
practices is to set the stage for mind-states requisite to
transcending ego-consciousness and self-identity and
to accessing the depths of the true self (Csordas, 1994;
Turner, 1969). The ethnographic literature is rich with
examples of transpersonal spiritual traditions that,
as with modern anthropology and neuropsychology,
acknowledge the transcendental nature of the self.
Finally, in terms of the evolution of the self, it
is interesting that most of the higher processes of self
and self-construal involve the most recent part of the
cerebral cortex, namely the prefrontal lobes. This crucial
neurophysiological factor should be more important to
anthropology than it heretofore has been (Goldberg, 2009;
Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin et al., 1990). For instance, it is
the frontal executive functions that have made the social
distribution of intelligence and complexity typical of our
species possible (Huberman, 1995). What is intriguing
here is that it is this same advanced cortical system of
cognitive imagining and emotion-modulating processes
that produces the kind of complex self-construal typical
of most people in all societies, and that also facilitates
advanced self-awareness and dynamic self-models
informing transpersonal phenomenological disciplines.
The prefrontal lobes make the distinctly human culturalself possible, as well as the self-actualizing mind-states of
the few, if any, who transcend cultural models of the self
in any society.
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Note
1.         Ethnological and ethnographic interest in the self has
burgeoned over the last three decades (e.g., Battaglia,
1995; Ben-Āmôs & Weissberg, 1999; Cohen, 1994;
Erchak, 1992; Heelas & Lock, 1981; Hollan, 1992;
Lindholm, 2007; Mageo, 1995, 2002a, 2003;
Morris, 1994; Sökefeld, 1999; Stromberg, 1985;
Throop, 2000; Van Wolputte, 2004; Whittaker,
1992). The focus of this literature has been on the
many ways that cultures construe the self, including
identity, ego, the “I” and the “me,” personhood, and
the like.
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